Players:
Associate Judges Blackburne-Rigsby and McLeese, Senior Judge Ruiz. Opinion by Ruiz. Concurrence by McLeese. Nicholas Q. Elton for Mr. Koonce. Motions Judge: Franklin A. Burgess. Trial Judge:
Ronna L. Beck.
Facts: Late in
the evening, Mr. Koonce’s SUV collided with another car, setting off a chain of
collisions with two more cars.
Undeterred, Mr. Koonce continued on his way and collided with a pickup
truck, followed by yet another car, at which point his SUV, now missing a
wheel, came to a stop. The MPD officers
on the scene testified that Mr. Koonce swayed back and forth, had slurred
speech, and smelled strongly of alcohol. Mr. Koonce refused to submit to field sobriety
testing, stating “[I am] not as drunk as they think I am.” When informed that refusing testing could
result in having his license suspended, he responded, “Revoke it for six
months.” The police found an open bottle
of vodka, which was removed, photographed, and discarded.
At the station, Mr. Koonce was placed in a holding
cell. He explicitly refused to provide a
urine sample and fell asleep in his cell before he could consent to or refuse
blood testing. There were cameras
located in the cell block, but by the time of trial, the video from the night
of Mr. Koonce’s arrest no longer existed. Per MPD practice, video of a particular day
will be available for approximately 30 days, but is then recorded over. The defense requested any video evidence 34
days after the incident, but the government did not act until shortly before
trial, by which time the video was no longer available.
Issue 1: Was the
government obligated to preserve the vodka bottle and the stationhouse video
under Superior Court Criminal Rule 16 (a)(1)(C)?
Holding: Yes. As
the to video, the Court held, “In the statutory and evidentiary context of
DUI/OWI prosecutions, it takes a small, logical step to conclude that video
that captures a suspect’s appearance, speech or actions soon after arrest and
that records when the suspect is being . . . asked to submit to testing will be
material to the defense.” The video was
“material” under Rule 16 and the government was obligated to preserve it.
As to the bottle, Rule 16 requires the government to
preserve seized items belonging to the defendant.
However, under the facts of this case, there was no due process violation because there was
no “willful refusal” by the government to preserve the requested evidence, and
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss the case on
due process grounds.
Issue 2: Did the
trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury to infer that
the unpreserved video supported the defense (but rather that the video had been
requested but was destroyed pursuant to policy, and the jury could draw its own
conclusions)?
Holding: No. The
Court found that the government had been negligent in failing to preserve the
video, but that there had been no “willful act” warranting a negative inference. The Court also noted that the other record
evidence about Mr. Koonce’s behavior and appearance strongly suggested that the
video would not support the defense.
Issue 3: Did the
trial court abuse its discretion in failing to suppress the photograph of the
bottle as a sanction for the government’s failure to preserve the actual
bottle?
Holding: No.
Although discarding the bottle was deliberate, it was not done in bad
faith. Furthermore, the case turned not
on whether the bottle was open, but whether Mr. Koonce was intoxicated, for
which there was independent, substantial evidence.
Concurrence (McLeese): Joining in the judgment, but disagreeing that the government had a duty to preserve the police station video.
Concurrence (McLeese): Joining in the judgment, but disagreeing that the government had a duty to preserve the police station video.
How to Use: The
Court noted that this time the government had not acted in bad faith for
apparently not realizing that the video evidence would be lost due to standard
MPD procedures. However, “once the
government is on notice of its obligations with respect to foreseeably
discoverable items of evidence in DUI/OWI cases that are likely to be in its
possession”—as it presumably is after this opinion—“lack of ‘willfulness’
ceases to be a defense to sanction for failure to preserve discoverable
evidence.” CP
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