Saturday, October 13, 2018

For assaults on police, the NEAR Act neither requires jury-demandable prosecution nor expands the right to claim self-defense.

Coleman v. United States (decided October 11, 2018)

Players: Associate Judges Glickman and Fisher and Senior Judge Washington. Opinion by Judge Washington. Fletcher P. Thompson for Appellant. Trial Judge: Kimberly S. Knowles.

Facts: MPD officers arrested appellant for assault on a police officer (“APO”) following an encounter outside of his vehicle. At trial, the government presented evidence that when the officers approached, appellant became agitated, ignored requests to move out of the street, and flung his arms wildly, hitting two officers. Appellant continued to resist, ripping a third officer’s uniform when police took him to the ground.

The government elected to prosecute appellant for misdemeanor simple assault, a non-jury-demandable offense, rather than APO, which would have been jury-demandable under the Neighborhood Engagement Achieves Results (“NEAR”) Act. Appellant nevertheless argued that he was entitled to a jury trial. Appellant further argued that because the government had declined to prosecute APO, he should not be bound by the limits on self-defense that apply when the complainant is a police officer. The trial court rejected both arguments and found appellant guilty of simple assault.

Issue 1: Whether the NEAR Act requires the government to charge jury-demandable APO when the complainant in an assault is a police officer?

Holding 1: No. The NEAR Act created separate APO and resisting arrest offenses in response to widespread concern that APO was too broadly defined. Although the Act also increased the penalty for misdemeanor APO and resisting arrest to make both offenses jury-demandable, there is no evidence that the Council intended to remove the government’s ability to prosecute simple assault where the complainant is a police officer. Simple assault remains a lesser and included offense of APO.

Issue 2: Whether the NEAR Act expands the right to claim self-defense in simple assault cases where the complainant is a police officer?

Holding 2: No. The rule whereby one may not use force against a police officer in self-defense unless the officer has used excessive force exists to protect officers in the line of duty. Although the NEAR Act limits what may constitute APO, there is no evidence that the Council intended to overrule the restriction on self-defense claims. Broadening the right to use force against officers would endanger them and impede their work. WC.

Read the full opinion here.

Tuesday, September 18, 2018

Leaving after colliding requires reason to believe a collision occurred.

Crawford v. United States (decided Sept. 6, 2018)

Players: Chief Judge Blackburne-Rigsby, Associate Judge McLeese, and Senior Judge Nebeker. Opinion by Chief Judge Blackburne-Rigsby. Dissenting Opinion by Senior Judge Nebeker. Rupa Ranga Puttagunta for Appellant. Trial Judge: Yvonne Williams.

Facts: Appellant was convicted for leaving after colliding with property damage. At trial, officers testified that they heard a “loud crash” while appellant was moving his car out of a parallel parking space. One officer testified that appellant’s vehicle was “up against the [one] in front of it,” a Volvo, having apparently collided with it, and that appellant then reversed and drove away at about ten miles per hour. The Volvo’s owner testified that he later observed a white streak along its rear bumper. Appellant denied having collided with the vehicle.

In rendering its findings of fact, the trial court expressed doubt as to whether appellant knew he had been in a collision, noting that he could have grazed the bumper without realizing it. The court nevertheless found appellant guilty based on its determination that lack of knowledge was no defense.

Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred by determining that lack of knowledge was not a defense?

Holding 1: Yes. “[N]ot being aware of the collision constitutes a proper defense if the operator of the vehicle did not know or have reason to believe that he or she had collided with another vehicle.” 

Issue 2: Whether, on remand, the trial court may reweigh the evidence and render a new verdict?

Holding 2: Yes. The trial court made no findings as to whether appellant should have known he had been in an accident.

Dissent: No. The trial court’s findings reflect reasonable doubt as to the mens rea for the offense and should compel a verdict of acquittal. WC.

Friday, September 14, 2018

DCCA: Neither the Second Amendment nor Wrenn bars CPWL prosecution of those with prior felony convictions.

Hooks v. United States (decided August 30, 2018)

Players: Associate Judges Fisher, Beckwith, and McLeese. Opinion by Judge Fisher. Donald L. Dworsky for Mr. Hooks. Trial Judge: Kimberly S. Knowles.

Issue 1: Whether the evidence suffices to support appellant’s convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm (UPF), carrying a pistol without a license (CPWL), possession of an unregistered firearm (UF), and unlawful possession of ammunition (UA)?

Holding 1: Yes. The evidence showed that as police were approaching appellant, he walked over to a metal dumpster; that the officers heard something metal hit the dumpster; and that appellant took his arm out of the dumpster and walked away. The officers found a loaded pistol in the dumpster and nothing else that would account for the noise they heard. When they pursued appellant, he ran. This evidence suffices to show beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant possessed the loaded pistol. Appellant stipulated to the remaining elements, including his prior felony conviction, at trial.

Issue 2: Whether the appellant’s CPWL conviction violated the Second Amendment?

Holding 2: No. Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017) did not invalidate the CPWL statute; it only invalidated (and enjoined enforcement of) the requirement to demonstrate “good reason to fear injury” or some other “proper” need to carry a pistol before obtaining a license to do so. That requirement is severable from the provision that penalizes carrying a pistol without a license and requires licensees to be otherwise “suitable” to obtain a license. Appellant was not “suitable” and further had no Second Amendment right to carry a pistol outside of his home because he had been convicted of a felony. WC.

Thursday, September 13, 2018

Police have a duty to preserve tangible evidence that comes even temporarily within their possession, custody, or control.

Weems v. United States (decided August 9, 2018)

Players: Associate Judges Glickman and Easterly, Senior Judge Pryor. Opinion for the Court by Judge Glickman. Concurring Opinion by Judge Easterly. D.C. Law Students in Court for Weems. Trial Judge: Ann O’Regan Keary.

Facts: Weems was arrested for shoplifting. Evidence showed that after Weems took four watches from a Wal-Mart jewelry department, a manager followed him to the bedding department, where Weems removed the security tags and packaging. The manager contacted the store security guard, an off-duty MPD officer. The officer and manager then went to confront Weems and found him taking more watches out of their packaging.

After placing Weems under arrest, the officer confiscated the watches but eventually returned them to Wal-Mart. The record does not show what happened to them after. The officer did not collect the security tags from the watches. Surveillance from the incident was lost in a hard drive crash in 2014. At trial, Weems moved for dismissal or appropriate sanction based on the government’s failure to preserve the watches, security tags, and surveillance. The trial court rejected this motion and found Weems guilty at a bench trial.

Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to sanction the government for violating Rule 16(a)(1)(E)?

Holding: No. There can be no violation of Rule 16(a)(1)(E) from failure to preserve tangible evidence that was never within the government’s possession, custody, or control. “Possession” means actual, not constructive, possession. “Custody” refers to property held for third-party benefit. “Control” means a “legal right” to access property “on demand,” for instance, by virtue of a contract or intergovernmental agreement.  On the other hand, neither third-party willingness to produce evidence nor government ability to obtain it by subpoena is sufficient to create “control.”

Under this test, the government only had a duty to preserve the watches seized, albeit briefly, by the police. By contrast, the police never assumed possession, custody, or control of the video or security tags, and there was no duty to preserve them based on the Wal-Mart employees’ role in the investigation. Participating did not make them “agents of law enforcement” or give MPD legal right to obtain the video and security tags. The watches, on the other hand, were confiscated by police and thus were in the government’s actual, physical custody, even if only temporarily. Even so, the trial court appropriately denied sanctions because there was no evidence of bad faith and the watches had little if any evidentiary value.

Of Note: 

  • This opinion does not alter the government’s duty to preserve written and recorded defendant statements under former Rule 16(a)(1)(A)/current Rule 16(a)(1)(B), which is governed by the Court’s opinion in Robinson v. United States, 825 A.2d 318 (D.C. 2003). See Slip Op. at 13-14.
  • The Court recognizes “that there could be circumstances in which a private party is sufficiently aligned with and subject to the direction of the police or prosecutor as to be deemed a member of the prosecution team for Rule 16 purposes,” but finds no such circumstances on the record presented.
    • Judge Easterly’s concurrence emphasizes that this holding does not take into account any official agreement between Wal-Mart and MPD or the fact that the officer retained his police powers and obligation to preserve evidence while off duty. Because possession/custody/control is a fact-bound inquiry, these factors may or may not lead to a different outcome in a different case. WC

Wednesday, August 22, 2018

Lack of retreat before imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury arose deemed irrelevant to defendant's self-defense claim.

Dawkins v. United States (decided July 26, 2018)

Players: Associate Judges Glickman, Easterly, and McLeese. Opinion by Judge Easterly. PDS for Mr. Dawkins. Trial Judge: Russell Canaan.

Mr. Dawkins was convicted of voluntary manslaughter after a jury trial. Evidence showed that he encountered a stranger, Mr. Cheek, early one morning, after both men had been out drinking. The two struck up a conversation. They had decided to go to a gas station to buy cigarettes, when the decedent, also unknown to Mr. Dawkins, drove up and asked whether Mr. Cheek was okay. Mr. Cheek said he was fine and to “go ahead,” but the decedent did not. After Mr. Dawkins asked the decedent to leave, the two got into an argument. The decedent got out of his car and went to the back of it. Mr. Dawkins followed. After more yelling, the decedent punched Mr. Dawkins. Mr. Dawkins punched back and, in the ensuing fistfight, stabbed the decedent in the neck. Mr. Cheek tried to separate the two at some point before this happened. Afterwards, Mr. Dawkins fled. The decedent got into his car, drove into a building, and bled out before the paramedics arrived.

At trial, Mr. Dawkins claimed self-defense based on his mistaken belief that Mr. Cheek and the decedent were ganging up on him. The government argued that while not technically the “first aggressor,” Mr. Dawkins had “aggressively approached” the decedent’s car and charged to the back of it when the decedent got out. The government ended its opening statement by encouraging the jury, over defense objection, to think about what Mr. Dawkins could have done instead, such as walking away.

Afterward, the defense sought an instruction clarifying that Mr. Dawkins did not lose the right to claim self-defense simply by failing to retreat before the fight started. The defense proposed to instruct that the jury could consider whether it was possible for Mr. Dawkins retreat, only after he used nondeadly force to defend himself. The government objected and submitted its own proposal, which did not distinguish between the relevance of retreat at any point in the encounter. The government’s proposal further stated, consistent with Pattern Jury Instruction 9.503, that “a person should take reasonable steps such as stepping back or walking away to avoid the necessity of taking a human life, so long as those steps are consistent with the person’s own safety” and that the jury “should therefore consider whether [Mr. Dawkins] could have taken those steps consistent with his own safety.” The trial court adopted the government’s proposal over defense objection. In its rebuttal closing, the government again argued, over defense objection, that Mr. Dawkins could have avoided using deadly force by retreating when the decedent got out of his car.

Issue: Did the trial court reversibly err by failing to provide adequate instruction on the potential relevance of Mr. Dawkins’s failure to retreat from the decedent?

Holding: Yes. “[I]n assessing the reasonableness of a defendant’s actions in the context of a self-defense claim, and specifically the defendant’s ability to retreat, the jury’s proper temporal focus is the time at which a defendant employs deadly force or has possible justification (based on a reasonable belief that he is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury) to do so.” The trial court’s instruction, which allowed the jury to think that it “should” consider the ability to retreat at any point in the encounter, failed to adequately convey this principle. The instruction was not harmless given the government’s repeated suggestion that the jury could consider Mr. Dawkins’s failure to walk away before he had any possible justification to use deadly force.

Of Note: 

  • The Court acknowledged that the defendant’s behavior before any possible justification for deadly force arises may be relevant to issues like credibility and provocation that were not present in Mr. Dawkins’s case.
  • The Court took no position on the correctness of the version of D.C. Pattern Instruction 9.503 that was in effect at the time of Mr. Dawkins’s trial. WC.
Read the full opinion here.

Thursday, June 28, 2018

Juries need to be properly instructed pursuant to Carrell to decide the difference between a true threat and a question.

Malloy v. United States (decided June 21, 2018)

Players: Associate Judges Easterly and McLeese, and Senior Judge Ferren. Opinion by Judge Ferren. Dissent by Judge McLeese. Matthew B. Kaplan for Mr. Malloy. Trial Judge: Anita M. Josey-Herring

Facts: Anthony Johnson was inside his car making a phone call when Malloy approached him, allegedly calling him “hot” (meaning a snitch), and asked him whether he was on the phone with police. Malloy continued to call Johnson “hot” and then allegedly said, “What if I shot your car,” to which Johnson replied, “Well I guess that make you feel good.” Malloy then allegedly said, “What if I shoot you,” and Johnson said, “I guess I be dead.” Several witnesses claimed that Malloy then pulled out a black pistol and pointed it at Johnson, who left and reported the incident to a police officer.

At trial, the court admitted testimony that, a few weeks before the charged incident, Malloy yelled at Johnson, calling him “hot” and threatening that “he’d shoot [Johnson’s] car up.” The government also played a recording of a jail call in which Malloy told Johnson's son, Anthony Tate, to tell his father not to come to court “because Tate and Tate’s mother still live around there . . . You know how that shit go,” but then said, “That’s not a threat.”

The defense called two eyewitnesses who testified that it was Johnson who told Malloy to go get his gun, and that Malloy did not threaten to shoot Johnson's car.

Issue 1: Did evidence of the prior threat introduced at trial unfairly prejudice the appellant?

Holding: No. Under (William) Johnson v. U.S., 683 A.2d 1087 (D.C. 1996) (en banc), the Court found the prior threat was “necessary to place [the] incident in context” and “complete the story” of the alleged crime. Johnson alleged that Malloy had a history of accusing him of being a snitch and threatening to shoot up his car, and the government used the prior threat to explain complainant’s unfazed response to the threat.

Issue 2: Did the trial court err in precluding defense witnesses' testimony about Johnson's and Malloy's statements during the confrontation?

Holding: No. The testimony about the statements was admitted, albeit with a limiting instruction that it was relevant only to the witnesses' state of mind.  That limiting instruction may have been wrong, because it was the state of mind of Johnson and Malloy that mattered, not the state of mind of the witnesses recounting those statements at trial.  However, since the limiting instruction was given only once, the DCCA held that there was no prejudice.

Issue 3: Did the jury instructions unconstitutionally permit the jury to find appellant guilty without finding an essential element of the offense of threats, i.e., the mens rea?

Holding: Yes. The DCCA reviewed the issue for plain error because trial counsel failed to object to the jury instruction during trial. At the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: “As to the charge of threatening to kidnap or injure a person, the elements of threat, each of which the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, are [1] that the defendant spoke words heard by Anthony Johnson; [2] the words the defendant spoke would cause a person reasonable to believe that Anthony Johnson would be serious harmed; and [3] that the defendant intended to make the communications which constituted the threat. The government is not required to prove that the defendant intended to carry out the threat. It is not necessary that . . . the intended victim actually heard the words or learned about them.”

In Carrell v. United States, 165 A.3d 314 (D.C. 2017) (en banc), the DCCA held that the defendant’s intent to threaten (or at least knowledge that his words will be construed as a threat) is an essential element of a threat. Thus, there was error. "Rather than include Carrell’s language applicable to a defendant’s intent, this instruction permitted conviction merely if the words spoken would cause a person ‘reasonably to believe’ that the complainant would be seriously harmed, without regard to whether the defendant intended such a threat or knew that the words would be perceived as a threat.”

The Court found that the error was “plain” because  “plainness” is assessed at the “time of appellate review regardless of the state of the law at the time of trial.” Accordingly, with the law established by Carrell, the instructional error was plain. The government did not dispute that the error was plain.

In determining whether the error affected substantial rights of the defendant, the Court considered the fact that the alleged threats were posed as questions and that the complainant seemed unfazed by them. Given these facts, there was a “reasonable probability that the jury’s verdict could have been swayed” by the jury instructions. In addition, the Court focused on the lack of overwhelming evidence in the case, which was essentially a credibility contest; that the jury had difficulty in their deliberations, twice asking whether a different episode in the case was the basis for the threats; and the fact that the jury acquitted appellant on all other charges. The error also affected the fairness and integrity of the proceedings, as the failure to instruct on the intent element was a constitutional error on a point that was seriously contested at trial.

Dissent: Judge McLeese dissented as to the instructional issue, noting that although he agreed that the instructions were “not correct,” Malloy's words were “objectively threatening.” Thus, in his view, there was no basis for finding that the jury would have doubted appellant’s intent to threaten.

Caroline Howe, Guest-blogging.

Tuesday, June 26, 2018

The en banc Court holds that defendants charged with deportable misdemeanors are entitled to jury trials.

Bado v. United States (en banc opinion) (decided June 21, 2018)

Players: En Banc Panel: Chief Judge Blackburne-Rigsby, Associate Judges Glickman, Fisher, Thompson, Beckwith, and Easterly, and Senior Judges Washington and Ruiz. Opinion by Judge Ruiz. Concurrences by Judge Washington and Judge Thompson. Dissent by Judge Glickman, joined by Judge Fisher. Dissent by Judge Fisher, joined by Judge Glickman. Alfred Carry and Moses Cook, D.C. Law Students, for Mr. Bado. PDS and Capital Area Immigrants‘ Rights (CAIR) Coalition, as amici curiae, in support of Mr. Bado. Motions judge: Honorable Jennifer M. Anderson. Trial judge: Honorable Stuart G. Nash.

Facts: Bado fled Burkina Faso and applied for asylum in the U.S. His asylum proceedings were halted when, in 2011, he was charged with three counts of misdemeanor sexual abuse of a minor. If convicted, he would be barred from receiving asylum and removed from the United States. Appellant then pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial. However, because a conviction for misdemeanor sexual abuse of a minor did not expose appellant to a sentence of more than 180 days in jail or a fine over $1000, the court denied his demand. At a bench trial, appellant testified in his own defense and questioned the credibility of the complainant. He was then acquitted of two of the three charges, but sentenced to 180 days in jail and ordered to pay $50 to the Crime Victims Compensation Fund. The U.S. then commenced deportation proceedings against him because of the conviction.

In 2015, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction after concluding that appellant’s right to a jury trial had been violated. The government then sought rehearing en banc that was granted, which resulted in the panel’s opinion being vacated. You can read about the panel's decision here and the grant of rehearing en banc here.

Issue: Was Mr. Bado entitled to a jury trial for a charge carrying a maximum penalty of six months or less, when a conviction for that charge also carried the threat of deportation?

Holding: Yes. “The Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant to a jury trial if he is charged with a deportable offense, even if the maximum period of incarceration does not exceed six months.”

Writing for the en banc majority, Senior Judge Ruiz explained that, in the United States, an individual is only entitled to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment when charged with a “serious” offense. Because exposure to incarceration usually is the clearest indicator of the seriousness of an offense, a crime with the possibility of punishment of more then six months incarceration automatically qualifies as a serious offense and requires a jury trial. However, the Court established that the presumption that an offense with a penalty of less than six months incarceration is a petty offense—not requiring a jury trial—can be overcome “if [the accused] can demonstrate that any additional statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction with the maximum authorized period of incarceration, are so severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense in question is a ‘serious one.’” Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989). In Blanton, the Supreme Court concluded that the possibility of suspension of a license and mandatory alcohol abuse courses for a driving under the influence conviction were not “significant” enough to render the offense a serious one for jury trial purposes.

Applying a Blanton analysis, the DCCA began with the presumption that misdemeanor sexual abuse of a minor was a petty offense for Sixth Amendment purposes since it had a 180-day maximum exposure to incarceration. But by noting there “is no comparison between the penalty of deportation and the statutory penalties considered in Blanton,” the Court concluded that Mr. Bado overcame the pettiness presumption by demonstrating that a 180-day jail sentence that also resulted in his placement in deportation proceedings was a serious offense. The “forced physical separation” of deportation is “considered by many immigrants to be worse than incarceration,” as deportation would result in the accused being separated from his family, exposed to poverty and violence in his home country, and barred from reentry for at least ten years per the U.S. immigration code. As the Court explained, “when a person faces deportation, serving the sentence is only the first step following conviction; once the sentence is completed, the person faces the burdens and anxiety that attend detention pending removal proceedings.” “[W]ith all the grave consequences that [removal] entails,” the “loss is so great as to be unquantifiable.”

The majority disagreed with the government’s contentions that deportation is not a penalty for a criminal offense; that removal should not be considered because it is a penalty imposed by Congress, not the D.C. Council, which created the offense; that deportation is irrelevant because it is not punishment; and that D.C. courts are not competent to determine the deportation consequence of a criminal conviction. The DCCA believed that all of the government’s arguments diverged from a “straightforward application of a Blanton analysis that includes the penalty of deportation.” As the Court spelled out, a Blanton analysis focuses on the “possible” statutory penalties that attach to a conviction, and did not distinguish between penal and civil penalties, while also disagreeing with the government’s argument that deportation is not a penal penalty. The Court also stated that the Blanton analysis looks at the possible penalties to the accused, from the accused’s point of view—meaning it was irrelevant here that a noncitizen in appellant’s situation would have the right to a jury trial where a citizen would not.

The DCCA also disagreed with the government’s contention that, because deportation is a product of federal law and not local law enacted by the D.C. Council, it does not factor into the jury-trial analysis. The DCCA instead held that the key is penalties enacted by “state action,” and in these circumstances, Congress “is the only legislative body that can prescribe the penalty of removal for a criminal conviction.” Lastly, the majority found the government’s reliance on application of the impact of deportation in non-Sixth Amendment situations, such as when it had been considered for double jeopardy or ex post facto purposes, to be unpersuasive. The Court stated that in this situation, the focus is not on a threshold question whether the proceeding is criminal—which would not apply to deportation proceedings—but what penalties flow from a conviction in a criminal case, which includes "collateral" consequences such as deportations.

And, to the extent that future courts may have difficult applying the holding of this case, the majority explained, “the difficulties that the government fears may come to pass in some other case are too remote and of insufficient import to outweigh the loss of the constitutional right to a jury trial.”

Judge Washington’s concurrence: Judge Washington noted the disparity between jury-trial rights for citizens and noncitizens. But instead of finding that a reason to limit the right to a jury trial, Judge Washington implored the D.C. Council to expand the right. Noting that D.C. is in the minority of jurisdictions that do not afford jury trials whenever a penalty of incarceration is at stake, Judge Washington urged the Council to “reconsider its decision to value judicial economy above the right to a jury trial. Restoring the right to a jury trial in misdemeanor cases could have the salutary effect of elevating the public’s trust and confidence that the government is more concerned with courts protecting individual rights and freedoms than in ensuring that courts are as efficient as possible in bringing defendants to trial.”

Judge Thompson’s concurrence: Judge Thompson, concurring in the judgment, stated that there is “no basis” for the majority’s conclusion that the penalty of deportation necessarily reflects a legislative determination that those offenses are serious. This is especially true because Congress has authorized “cancellation of removal” for noncitizens convicted of certain deportable offenses, indicating that at least some deportable offenses may not be that serious. However, in this case, because Mr. Bado was convicted of an "aggravated felony" under immigration law (a conviction for which no relief is possible in the immigration courts), Judge Thompson believed that Mr. Bado was entitled to a jury trial.

Judge Fisher’s dissent, joined by Judge Glickman: Judge Fisher considered it a “startling result” that a citizen charged with misdemeanor sexual abuse of a child is not entitled to a jury trial, while a noncitizen charged with the same crime is. Judge Fisher suggested that the “seriousness” of the offense cannot depend on the identity and individual circumstances of the defendant. Judge Fisher also thought that “we must keep firmly in mind that we are dealing here with two different legislatures”:  criminal statutes enacted by the D.C. Council, and immigration laws enacted by the U.S. Congress.

Judge Glickman’s dissent, joined by Judge Fisher: Judge Glickman added an additional point: the pettiness presumption of Blanton can only be overcome if the defendant shows that the legislature that actually enacted the criminal offense determined that additional civil penalties should be attached to the offense. Here, the U.S. Congress’s determination that an offense is deportable has no bearing on the D.C. Council’s view about the seriousness of misdemeanor sexual abuse of a minor.

Of note:
  • In any case against a noncitizen charged with a 180-day misdemeanor, be certain to check if it is a deportable offense, and if so, advise your client that she may demand a jury trial.
  • Although Bado focuses on deportation, its rationale applies to all “severe” collateral consequences of conviction, which can include sex offender registration. The majority states that the consequence does not have to be “punitive” to count toward the jury trial right, and Senior Judge Washington’s concurrence states that many collateral consequences are severe enough to trigger the right to a jury trial. 
KC Bridges, guest blogging.