Tuesday, March 31, 2015

DCCA upholds order to vacate home in CPO case, even where the parties did not jointly own or occupy the home

Alfredo Salvattera v. Isela Ramirez, No. 14-FM-1006 (decided March 26, 2015)

Players: Associate Judges Glickman and Fisher, Senior Judge Steadman.  Opinion by Fisher.  PDS for Alfredo Salvattera.  Skadden Arps for Isela Ramirez.  Trial Judge: Fern F. Saddler. 

Facts:  Mr. Salvattera and Ms. Ramirez lived on different floors of the same apartment building.  Ms. Ramirez filed a petition for a Civil Protective Order pursuant to D.C. Code § 16-1005(c), alleging that Mr. Salvattera had sexually assaulted her.  The petition requested, among other things, that the court order Mr. Salvattera to vacate his apartment.  The trial court granted the petition and ordered Mr. Salvattera to vacate his apartment in less than three weeks.  Mr. Salvattera filed a motion under D.C. Superior Court Rule 59(e) asking the trial court to remove the requirement that he vacate his apartment.  When that request was denied, Mr. Salvattera appealed, and the DCCA granted his request for a stay. 

Issue: Whether, under the Intra-Family Offenses Act, a trial court is authorized to order a respondent to vacate his home under the “catchall” provision in the statute that allows the judge to order any relief that is “appropriate” under the circumstances, when the statute has a specific provision dealing with orders to vacate a residence.

Holding:  Yes.  The DCCA concluded that in enacting D.C. Code § 16-1005(c)(4), which deals with orders to vacate a residence, the D.C. Council intended to regulate  the “paradigmatic situation” in which the petitioner and respondent live together.  See Slip Op. at 8.  However, according to the DCCA, the Council did not intend this provision to become the exclusive source of a trial court’s authority to order a respondent to vacate a dwelling.  Therefore, trial court had authority under D.C. Code § 16-1005(c)(11) to order Mr. Salvattera to vacate his home, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the trial court’s stay-away order.

Of Note:
  • In this case, there was only one staircase in the apartment building, so Ms. Ramirez would have to come within a few feet of Mr. Salvattera’s apartment when accessing her own apartment, making the trial court’s stay-away order difficult to enforce as long as Mr. Salvattera remained in the building.  Use this unusual circumstance to distinguish your case.
  • Remind trial courts that the relief upheld here is “a serious step, not to be lightly undertaken[.]”  Slip Op. at 11 (quoting Robinson, 886 A.2d 78, 86 (D.C. 2005).  NG


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