Brian Lamont Copeland v. United States, No. 13-CO-746
(decided March 12, 2015).
Players: Chief
Judge Washington, Associate Judge Fisher, and Senior Judge Ferren. Opinion by Judge Fisher. Jenifer Wicks for Mr. Copeland. Trial Judge: Anthony C. Epstein.
Facts: Brian
Copeland was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse, and his conviction was
affirmed on appeal. Mr. Copeland
subsequently filed a motion for relief under D.C. Code § 23-110, alleging that
his trial attorney had performed deficiently during jury selection. At trial, Mr. Copeland’s defense attorney had
conducted voir dire at the bench, and
the trial judge had turned on the “husher,” a white noise machine intended to
prevent those present in the courtroom from overhearing conversations at the bench. Mr. Copeland remained seated at defense
counsel’s table and did not participate in voir
dire. His attorney did not advise
him of his right, pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim R. 43(a) and the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, to be present at the bench during voir dire. When Mr. Copeland
challenged this oversight by filing a § 23-110 motion in Superior Court, the
trial judge rejected his motion without a hearing.
Issue 1: Assuming
that the performance of Mr. Copeland’s trial attorney was deficient, did Mr.
Copeland establish that he had been prejudiced by that performance?
Holding 1:
No. Mr. Copeland filed an affidavit in
support of his § 23-110 motion, but the affidavit did not claim that Mr.
Copeland would have exercised his right to be present at the bench during voir dire and did not assert that his
trial attorney should have conducted voir
dire differently or challenged any other jurors. Consequently, Mr. Copeland failed to show
that he had been prejudiced by his attorney’s conduct.
Issue 2: Can
Mr. Copeland’s failure to show prejudice be excused because the trial court’s voir dire procedures violated
Appellant’s right to a public trial and, thus, amounted to a structural error
in which prejudice must be presumed?
Holding 2: No. Unlike situations where the public is
excluded from the courtroom during trial, the common practice of conducting
individual voir dire at the bench is
not a structural error. It is worth
noting that if the Court had ruled that defense counsel’s behavior at trial
amounted to deficient performance and that it was a structural error, most
criminal defendants who were recently convicted in D.C. would have valid §
23-110 claims.
Of note: The
Court’s opinion highlights the importance of identifying a specific form of
prejudice when filing § 23-110 motions.
The opinion also suggests that challenges to the trial court’s voir dire procedures are unlikely to
garner defendants relief if trial counsel has not lodged a timely objection. CK
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