Judge Can't Wear Two Different Hats -- A Judge Ruling on a Motion To Withdraw a Guilty Plea Cannot Resolve a Factual Dispute Based on His Own Recollection of What Happened at the Plea Hearing

Jose Zalmeron v. United States (decided October 29, 2015)

Players: Associate Judges Thompson and Beckwith, Senior Judge Belson. Opinion by Judge Beckwith. PDS for Mr. Zalmeron. Trial judge: Lee Satterfield.

Facts: Mr. Zalmeron pleaded guilty before Judge Satterfield back in 1994 in a drug case. Twenty years later, he moved to withdraw his plea on the ground that he had not been advised that his conviction could cause him to be deported. Transcripts from the 1994 plea were unavailable. Without hearing from the government, Judge Satterfield denied the motion to withdraw, stating "[u]pon review of the chambers file the Court recalls" that it did advise Mr. Zalmeron of the potential immigration consequences of his plea. Mr. Zalmeron than moved for disclosure of the chambers file, both because he asserted a right to review the evidence on which the ruling was based and to allow for appellate review of the ruling. The government then chimed in, suggesting that disclosure of the chambers file was unnecessary because the court's ruling was based on the judge's own "recollection," which “exists separate and apart from the documents in the chambers file."  Judge Satterfield agreed with the government and denied the request to disclose the chambers file.  Mr. Zalmeron then moved to vacate the order and for an evidentiary hearing before an independent judicial officer, asserting that Judge Satterfield could not serve as both witness and factfinder.  And, because Judge Satterfield was now Chief Judge of the Superior Court, Mr. Zalmeron argued that all of the Superior Court judges were subject to recusal, and the hearing should be in front of a DCCA judge sitting by designation.  Judge Satterfield did not do any of that, and Mr. Zalmeron appealed.

Issue 1:  Is Mr. Zalmeron entitled to a reversal or a remand on his claim that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea?

Holding 1:  After some concessions by the government, he is entitled to a remand, but not an outright reversal.  The government did not argue that Judge Satterfield's claimed "recollection" was sufficient to support the denial of the motion to withdraw in the face of a statutory presumption that the required immigration warnings were not given.  A remand rather than a reversal was warranted, however, because the government did not waive its right to present additional evidence that Mr. Zalmeron received the required warnings.  The sequence of events in the Superior Court did not clearly put the government on notice that the failure to adduce additional evidence at that time would amount to a waiver.

If the government seeks to rely on Judge Satterfield's recollection, however, then binding precedent dictates that the hearing must be in front of a different judge because Judge Satterfield cannot be both witness and factfinder.  Apparently agreeing with Mr. Zalmeron that all the Superior Court judges would be recused given the powers the Chief Judge has over their assignments and working conditions, the DCCA would leave it up to the Superior Court to determine whether a new judge should be drawn from either the DCCA or the federal district court.

Issue 2;  Did the twenty year delay in Mr. Zalmeron seeking to withdraw his plea warrant denial of his motion?

Holding 2:  No, but any unexcused delay is a factor that the court can take into account in ruling on the motion.  The text of the statute authorizing withdrawal of guilty pleas in these circumstances, D.C. Code section 16-713, does not contain a time limitation, and it would be improper for the court to read such a limitation into the text.  Any period of unexplained delay, however, may be taken into account when the factfinder considers the credibility of Mr. Zalmeron's claim. DG

Read full opinion here.