DCCA to MPD: If you’re going to handcuff a suspect, you’d better issue Miranda warnings before you start asking questions.

Fredrick E. Morton v. United States (decided October 29, 2015).

Players: Chief Judge Washington, Associate Judge Blackburne-Rigsby, Senior Judge Ferren.  Opinion for Chief Judge Washington.  Concurrence by Senior Judge Ferren.  PDS for Mr. Morton.  Trial Judge: Lynn Leibovitz.

Facts: Fredrick Morton was chased, detained, and handcuffed on suspicion of engaging in a drug transaction.  He tossed a wallet along the way, which police picked up.  The investigating officers told him that he was not under arrest but stated, “We need to know why you ran.  Why would you run if you didn’t do anything?”  The officers later asked, “What was up with the wallet?” “I saw you throw a wallet.  What’s up with the wallet?”    Client said he found it on the Metro.  He was then formally arrested.

Issue: Whether Mr. Morton was in custody for Fifth Amendment purposes, when (1) he was restrained with handcuffs after being chased by police, and (2) police confronted him with evidence that was sufficient to establish at least probable cause that he had committed a crime, but (3) police told him that he was not under arrest before he was questioned, and (4) the questioning was brief and (5) took place on a public street where (6) the investigating officers did not brandish weapons.

Holding: Yes.  “Mr. Morton’s detention by use of handcuffs, although not strictly dispositive on this issue, strongly militates toward a finding of Miranda custody.”  Slip op. at 13.

Of Note: 

• The Court offers a handy review of the factors that are relevant to determining whether an individual is in custody for Fifth Amendment purposes: the degree to which the police physically restrain the suspect (including whether the police use handcuffs); what the police say to the suspect (especially whether police tell the suspect that he is not under arrest and may decline to answer questions); whether interrogation occurs in public or in a “secluded area;” the length of the detention and questioning; whether the police questioning is “inquisitorial” or “accusatory;” the show of force or brandishing of weapons by the police; whether the suspect is confronted with obvious evidence of his guilt; and whether the police already have sufficient cause to arrest, and the suspect knows this.  Slip op. at 11-12.

• The government argued that Mr. Morton was not in custody because police told him that he was not under arrest.  The Court found this argument unconvincing, reasoning that this statement by police is not worth much if police do not also inform the suspect that he is free to leave or that he may decline to answer questions. 

• The Court declined to rule on whether, in the Fifth Amendment context, the “reasonable person” test presupposes a “reasonable innocent person,” as opposed to simply a “reasonable person” in the defendant’s position.  Read Senior Judge Ferren’s concurrence for a thorough discussion of why, for Fifth Amendment purposes, the detainee’s state of mind is that of a reasonable person in the detainee’s position.  NG

Read full opinion here.