NOTE: Updates to previous Year-in-Review posts:
Following the publication of Parts 1 and 2 of the (Early) Year in Review, the DCCA decided cases related to issues covered in those sections. For this reason, on October 15, 2019, synopses of the DCCA's opinions in
Andrews v. D.C., 17-CT-523 (decided August 15, 2019) and
Jackson v. U.S., 16-CO-523 (decided August 22, 2019) were added to the Fourth Amendment section of
Part 1. Similarly, on October 21, 2019, synopses of the DCCA's opinions in
Sims v. U.S., 15-CF-914 (decided August 15, 2019) and
U.S. v. Nelson, 18-CO-53 (decided October 3, 2019) were
added to the Evidentiary Issues section of
Part 2. Similarly, where a future DCCA case decides an issue related to a topic covered in a previous year-in-review post, a synopsis of the case will be added to the relevant prior post. The (Early) Year in Review continues below with Part 3. - WCC
UPDATE: Foster v. U.S., 17-CM-994 (decided November 7, 2019) was added to Elements/Sufficiency of the Evidence section of this post on November 8, 2019. Ruffin v. U.S., 15-CF-1378 (decided November 21, 2019) was added to the same section on November 25, 2019. WCC
SECOND AMENDMENT
Dubose v. U.S., 18-CO-674 (decided August 8, 2019) –
- Holding 1: Trial counsel was not deficient for failing to challenge appellant’s CPWL, UF, and UA charges under the Second Amendment, in light of Wrenn v. D.C., 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017), which struck down part of D.C.’s gun licensing statute, because that case is not controlling and appellant had already been convicted and sentenced by the time it was decided. Slip Op. at 4-7.
- Holding 2: Appellant was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to challenge the CPWL, UF, and UA statutes on Second Amendment grounds because, notwithstanding any defect in the licensing statute, appellant lacked the statutorily required registration certificate for the gun he possessed and had not shown that he was otherwise qualified to obtain a license to carry it. Id. at 7-12.
PRETRIAL DISCLOSURES
- Holding: Where appellant was arrested by an MPD officer after refusing to leave a McDonald’s as requested by the special police officer (SPO) working there, the Jenck’s act did not entitle appellant to receive the incident report that the SPO submitted to the McDonald’s corporation. The government never “possessed” the report for Jenck’s act purposes because, in preparing it, the SPO was functioning as a McDonald’s contractor rather than a member of the prosecution team.
ELEMENTS/SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
**Ruffin v. U.S., 15-CF-1378 (decided November 21, 2019) – First-Degree Burglary/Kidnapping
- Holding 1: Proof that appellant pushed complainant at knife-point through the entrance and into the common hallway of her multi-unit row house apartment building was sufficient to establish that he “enter[ed] . . . [a] dwelling” as required for the crime of first-degree burglary, even though appellant did not enter into any apartment before he fled the scene. A “dwelling” includes “any enclosed space used for human habitation,” such as a residential apartment building. Slip Op. at 9. The common hallway at issue, located behind a locked door, was “in no way . . . so open to the public at large as to be considered outside” and was therefore “part of the private dwelling.” Id. at 12.
- Holding 2: The evidence presented was sufficient to establish kidnapping, notwithstanding withstanding appellant’s argument that the only detention of complainant was brief and incidental to the assault and robbery complainant suffered. Id. at 14-15.
*
Foster v. U.S., 17-CM-994 (decided November 7, 2019) – Unlawful Entry
- Holding: Evidence that appellant violated a notice purporting to bar him from three out of six buildings in the DCHA development where he lived with his mother was insufficient to establish the crime of unlawful entry, where appellant’s mother’s lease apparently granted appellant access to the entire development, including all common areas and grounds associated with all buildings. Although special police officers testified that the development had been subdivided into three-building sections for purposes of issuing and enforcing barring notices, and that appellant had been barred from the section where he did not reside, the alleged subdivision was not reflected in appellant’s mother’s lease agreement, which listed appellant as a household member and which was further binding on DCHA. Accordingly, the government failed to prove that appellant was an “unauthorized person” subject to barring on the property listed in the notice, i.e., that he was not a “member of [a] resident’s household” on the property in question. 14 DCMR § 9600.2.
Roberts v. U.S., 17-CF-341 (decided September 26, 2019) – Unlawful Disclosure
- Holding 1: “[U]nlawful disclosure [under D.C. Code § 22-3052] can include making a sexual image available for viewing even if the image is not actually viewed by anyone other than the defendant and the person depicted in the image.” Slip Op. at 20.
- Holding 2: Instructions requiring the jury to find that the defendant “exhibited the sexual image to another person or . . . in a place where it is viewable [by] another person” did not adequately convey that unlawful disclosure requires disclosure or exhibition to someone other than the person depicted in the image. Id. at 21-22. This error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence that the images were available to be seen by others was not overwhelming. Id. at 23-24. The error cannot be rectified by entry of judgment on attempted unlawful disclosure because it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant attempted to display the images to anyone other than the person depicted in the image. Id. at 26.
- Holding 3: There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s unlawful disclosure convictions because, for each count, there was evidence that the defendant made a sexual image available for viewing by someone other than the person depicted, and the person depicted was “identified or identifiable” to herself or, in one case, her mother. Id. at 30-32. Unlawful disclosure does not require that the person depicted be “identified or identifiable” based on the content of the image alone. Id. at 32-33. Nor does it require that the person depicted be identified by, or identifiable to, anyone other than the person depicted. Id. at 35
- Holding: The trial court’s finding that appellant failed to leave a McDonald’s after a special police officer asked him to do so several times was sufficient to support appellant’s conviction for unlawful entry. Slip Op. at 13-16.
- Rehearing en banc granted to consider whether evidence of unwanted touching is sufficient to establish simple assault under D.C. Code § 22-404(a). See the panel opinion for more information about the evidence presented.
White v. U.S., 17-CF-530 (decided May 9, 2019) – Possession of a Prohibited Weapon (PPW)/Assault with a Dangerous Weapon (ADW)/Insurance Fraud/Aggravated Assault/Assault with Significant Bodily Injury
- Holding 1: Where an indictment charged ADW (a pole) and PPW (a pole), the trial court did not err in instructing that the government had no burden to prove that the pole in evidence was the pole possessed and used in the assault. Slip Op. at 7-10. Rather, the government’s burden was to prove that the item possessed and used to commit assault was a pole and that the pole was a dangerous weapon.
- Holding 2: Evidence that appellant “fixed up” falsified receipts and communicated with a fraud investigator regarding a false insurance claim was sufficient to sustain his convictions for first-degree insurance fraud and conspiracy to commit insurance fraud. Id. at 11-12.
- Holding 3: Evidence that, after being struck in the head with a metal pole, complainant was bloody, disoriented, and in pain but resisted going to the hospital and was discharged after receiving a CT scan and a prescription for Tylenol 3 was insufficient to establish “serious bodily injury” as required for an aggravated assault conviction but sufficient to establish “significant bodily injury” as required for felony assault. Id. at 13-25.
Johnson v. U.S., 17-CM-1117 (decided May 9, 2019) – Second Degree Child Cruelty/Possession of a Prohibited Weapon (PPW)
- Holding 1: Evidence was sufficient to show “excessive force” required for attempted second degree child cruelty conviction, where “appellant repeatedly, forcefully, and indiscriminately beat A.J. with a broomstick-like stick while he was sitting on the floor in the corner of his room with his arm over his head.”
- Holding 2: Evidence was sufficient to show that the wooden stick was a “dangerous weapon” for purposes of PPW conviction, where appellant wielded it with “force hard enough to break [it] and cause bruises and marks on A.J.’s body, . . . without taking any precaution to avoid striking parts of A.J.’s body that would cause serious injury, such as his head or face,” even though stick did not actually cause great bodily injury.
- Holding 1: To support a conviction for attempted stalking under D.C. Code 22-3133(a), the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant: (1) purposely engaged in a course of conduct involving at least two occasions of statutorily proscribed behavior (e.g., following, monitoring, or communicating) and (2) possessed the requisite mental state—e.g., should have known that a “reasonable person in [complainant’s] circumstances” would fear for her or another’s safety, “[f]eel seriously alarmed, disturbed, or frightened,” or “[s]uffer emotional distress”—on at least two of the occasions comprising the “course of conduct.” Slip Op. at 2-3, 22-33.
- Holding 2: The “should have known” standard is objective and depends on whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s circumstances would have known that his conduct would cause a reasonable person in the complainant’s position to feel the requisite fear, alarm, disturbance, fright, or emotional distress. Id. at 35-37. “[T]he level of fear, alarm, or emotional distress” that a reasonable complainant would experience as a result of the defendant’s conduct “must rise significantly above that ‘which [is] commonly experienced in day to day living,’ and must involve a ‘severe[] intrusion on the victim’s personal privacy and autonomy[.]’ Ordinary ‘uneasiness, nervousness, [and] unhappiness’ are insufficient.” Id. at 40-41 (citations omitted).
Holman v. D.C., 15-CT-335 (decided February 28, 2019) – Civil Protective Order (CPO) Violation
- Holding: Intentional placement of telephone calls may qualify as “contact” for the purposes of a CPO violation, even where the calls go unanswered. Even assuming that the recipient had to be aware of the call while the defendant was making it, the record supports that the recipient was aware of the defendant’s calls and chose not to answer them.
SELF-DEFENSE
Smith v. U.S., 15-CO-363 (decided March 14, 2019) –
- Holding: In a murder case, where evidence showed that appellant left an altercation with the decedent to arm himself before returning to the altercation and shooting the decedent, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present a defense of perfect or imperfect self-defense (i.e., manslaughter) based on evidence that the decedent had threatened appellant with pocket knife. Such evidence could not have entitled appellant to a jury instruction on perfect or imperfect self-defense because appellant “deliberately chose to risk the fatal encounter . . . by arming himself with a deadly weapon and going to confront” the decedent, Slip Op. at 14, and “initiated the confrontation with the victim with the intent to kill or do great bodily harm.” Id. at 19-20.
Blades v. U.S., 15-CF-663 (decided January 23, 2019) –
- Holding: The prosecutor’s closing argument suggesting that appellant could not claim self-defense because he “brought [a] gun to the neighborhood” had the potential to convey an “erroneous” message about loss of the right to claim self-defense but ultimately did not when taken together with the remainder of the closing. Slip Op. at 25. Any error in instructing the jury that first aggressors and provocateurs forfeit the right to self-defense was harmless. Id. at 30-34
*Added November 8, 2019
*Added November 25, 2019
WCC
Double Stranded DNA with Coloured Bases, licensed under Creative Commons
