Turn off your ignition if you don’t want the cops to do it for you

Michael A. Hawkins v. United States, No. 13-CM-816 (decided April 9, 2015)

Players:  Associate Judges Thompson and Beckwith, Senior Judge Nebeker.  Opinion by Judge Nebeker.  Howard Margulies for Mr. Hawkins.  Trial judge: Patricia A. Broderick.

Facts:     Mr. Hawkins moved to suppress evidence found in a car by deputy marshals after they executed a fugitive warrant for his arrest.  The incident began when the deputy marshals, who were conducting surveillance at an apartment complex in an attempt to arrest Mr. Hawkins on a fugitive warrant, saw Mr. Hawkins walk out of an apartment building with a red backpack, enter the driver’s side of a car that was parked in the parking lot, put his backpack on the front passenger seat and start the engine.  Mr. Hawkins then stepped out and walked towards the back of the car, at which point one of the deputy marshals placed him under arrest.  The other marshal entered the driver’s side of the car to turn off the ignition.  When he opened the door, he noticed a strong smell of marijuana – a smell that the second marshal smelled “right in front of him” as he opened the passenger door.  The marshals then took the backpack out of the car and searched it, finding the evidence that Mr. Hawkins sought to suppress.

 

Issue:  Whether the marshals violated the Fourth Amendment by entering the car.   

Held:  The Court first held that the trial judge was wrong to conclude that the search was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.  First, the Court noted, turning off a vehicle left running in a parking lot is not analogous to the other circumstances that support the exigent circumstances exception from the warrant requirement:  hot pursuit of a suspect, prevention of evidence destruction, or prevention of immediate bodily injury.  Second, the exigent circumstances exception only excuses the failure to obtain a warrant – the search must still be supported by probable cause – and at the time that the marshals entered into the car, they lacked the probable cause that would be required to justify a search or obtain a warrant.

 

The Court nonetheless affirmed the trial court’s ruling, holding the search was justified under the community caretaking doctrine.  Under Supreme Court case law, the community caretaking exception applies when an officer’s activities are “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the the violation of a criminal statute.”  Cady v. Dumbrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).  In this case, the Court set out a 4-point test for courts to apply to assess whether an officer’s community caretaking conduct is reasonable, noting that the government must show:  1) by specific and articulable facts that the government’s conduct was totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute; 2) the government’s conduct was reasonable considering the availability, feasibility, and effectiveness of alternatives to the officer’s action; 3) the officer’s action ended when the citizen or community was no longer in need of assistance; and 4) the government’s interests outweigh the citizen’s interest in being free from minor government interference.  The Court noted that the government is not required to pursue the least restrictive means of correcting the problem. 

Applying the test to the facts, the Court concluded that the marshal’s action in entering the car to turn off the running engine was justified:  the action was necessary to safeguard the car and its contents from theft, as well as to prevent excessive emissions, unauthorized use of the vehicle, and a non-moving violation; there was no evidence that the owner was readily available to take control of the car; the marshals could not have sought a warrant because there was no crime-based probable cause to enter the car; the privacy interest in a car is less than the privacy interest in a dwelling; and the entry was minimal.  The Court therefore concluded that the marshals’ entry into the car was reasonable and no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.  

  

Of Note:

• The opinion should be read with care, because the Court notes a number of factual circumstances that are important to its conclusion that the entry into the car was reasonable.  For instance, the Court notes that the situation would be “entirely different” if “the owner of the vehicle was at the scene and ready to take possession of the vehicle.”  The Court also notes that the marshals smelled the marijuana immediately upon entering the vehicle, “well before turning off the engine and retrieving the keys.”  And that the entry “was minimal,” because the officers “did not search through the rest of the car or open any closed containers or compartments” (until they had independent grounds to do so).  The Court also emphasized the Supreme Court’s holding that an individual’s privacy interest in a vehicle is lesser than his or her privacy interest in a dwelling.  JF

Read full opinion here.