Sequarn Tibbs v. United States, No. 13-CF-1425 (decided January 15, 2015)
Players: Thompson, Newman, Ferren.
Opinion by Judge Thompson. Nancy
E. Allen for Mr. Tibbs. Trial Judge:
Herbert B. Dixon, Jr.
Facts: Mr. Tibbs and two co-defendants pled guilty to assault with
a deadly weapon (“ADW”), conspiracy to commit ADW, two counts of voluntary
manslaughter, and carrying a pistol without a license. The government proffered the following facts
during the Rule 11 plea colloquy: Late one night, the two co-defendants and
three co-conspirators went to Clay Terrace, where one of the co-defendant’s mothers—Ms.
Wilkins—lived. The group suspected that
Clay Terrace residents had stolen a handgun from Ms. Wilkins’ home. Armed with guns of their own, the group went
to retrieve the gun. They approached a
group of Clay Terrace residents, demanded the return of the gun, and spent the
night awaiting its return. Mr. Tibbs
joined the group in the early morning hours.
Later that morning, a Clay Terrace resident returned Ms. Wilkins’
gun. Satisfied, the group left Ms.
Wilkins’ home. According to the
prosecutor, “instead of leaving the neighborhood, [the group] went into a
courtyard where a number of Clay Terrace residents were present.” A gun battle ensued. Two people died and three people were
wounded.
The court did not ask the
defendants if the government’s proffer was correct. Instead, the court asked each defendant about
his “participation as far as the shootout is concerned.” In their responses, Mr. Tibbs and his
co-defendants contradicted a key part of the proffer—all three insisted that
they attempted to leave the neighborhood, and only went to the Clay Terrace
courtyard after a resident called them there.
They also insisted that they drew their guns in self-defense.
At sentencing, Mr. Tibbs’
counsel moved to withdraw the guilty plea, contending there was no factual
basis for the plea since Mr. Tibbs described an act of self-defense. The court summarily denied the motion.
Holding: No. The trial judge
erred by failing to address whether appellant made a valid assertion of legal
innocence. See Gooding v. United States, 529 A.2d 301 (1987). The government argued any error was harmless,
as Mr. Tibbs had no valid claim of self-defense because he “voluntarily placed
himself in a position which he could reasonably expect would result in violence.” See,
e.g., Howard v. United States,
656 A.2d 1106, 1111 (D.C. 1995). This
argument fails because the line of precedent on which it relies deals with defendants
who had violent or threatening encounters with specific individuals and then sought
out those same individuals. Here, the
government’s proffer made no mention of any threatening or violent encounter,
and even if there was such an encounter, the group never sought to reinitiate. Put simply, the trial court “did not make a
full inquiry to ferret out additional details during the plea proceeding to
determine whether appellant could avail himself of a self-defense claim.” The Court remanded for further consideration.
How to Use/Of Note:
· The trial court must consider all three Gooding factors and any inconsistencies
between the government’s proffer and the defendant’s statement should be fully
resolved. When making a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea, make sure to highlight any factual inconsistencies or
claims of error supporting the motion.
· The line of precedent holding that a claim of
self-defense is unavailable to defendants who place themselves in situations
that could reasonably be expected to result in violence has been cabined. Now, it is incumbent upon the government to
show a recent history of threatening or violent interactions and that the defendant reinitiated
contact. DSH
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