Roosevelt Whitfield v. United States, No. 11-CF-1451
(decided September 18, 2014)
Players: Associate Judges Glickman and
Blackburne-Rigsby, Senior Judge Nebeker.
Opinion by Judge Blackburne-Rigsby.
PDS for Appellant. Motions judges
Anthony Epstein and Robert Morin.
Facts: Police stopped a car with Texas plates solely
because a license plate frame obstructed the words “Lone Star State” at the
bottom of the license plate. The license
plate number and state name were legible and unobstructed.
The driver of the car was Roosevelt Whitfield, a member of the U.S. Air
Force who also worked as a bank security guard.
During the traffic stop, an officer saw a firearm holster inside the car
in plain view. Police asked whether Mr. Whitfield
had any weapons, and when they thought he appeared nervous, they conducted a protective
pat-down and again asked whether he had any weapons. Mr. Whitfield disclosed that he had a .38
caliber handgun in the car. Officers
found the loaded firearm and extra ammunition and arrested Mr. Whitfield. The firearm was registered in Virginia, where
Mr. Whitfield lived. Mr. Whitfield moved
to suppress the gun and ammunition, arguing that the traffic stop was unlawful
because his license plate complied with the relevant municipal regulations. After the motion was denied, he entered a conditional
plea to attempted CPWL, possession of an unregistered firearm, and unlawful
possession of ammunition.
Issue: Do the D.C. Municipal
Regulations—specifically,18 DCMR §§ 422.5 and 422.6—make it unlawful to have a
license plate frame that covers any part of the license plate, even where the
plate’s identifying information is not obscured?
Holding: The municipal regulations do not impose a
flat ban on all license plate frames, but rather prohibit only “those materials
or attachments that obstruct the identifying
information” on the license plate. Slip op. at 20 (emphasis original). The
traffic stop was therefore illegal and the motion to suppress should have been
granted.
Of Note:
- The Court observed that the regulations appear to impose a flat prohibition against license plate frames if read literally, but after considering the rest of the regulatory context, as well as the legislative history and intent, it determined that the regulatory provisions were ambiguous. It therefore applied the rule of lenity to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the appellant.
- In finding the regulations ambiguous, the Court placed great weight on the fact that a literal interpretation “would impact countless individuals who drive in the District of Columbia and who have license plate frames on their vehicles.” Slip op. at 31. See also id. at 3, 18-19.
- Although the D.C. Council could choose to enact legislation imposing a blanket prohibition against all license plate frames, it would have to use precise language that clearly indicated such legislative intent. See Slip op. at 29-30 & n.22. MW
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