Friday, May 23, 2014

The DCCA clarifies the mens rea for receiving stolen property and writes a model instruction.


Alphonso Owens v. United States, 13-CF-1332 (decided May 15, 2014)

The Players: Judges Fisher, Easterly and Ferren.  Opinion by Judge Fisher.  William T. Morrison  for appellant.  Trial Judge:  Heidi Pasichow.

The Facts: Two days after a Maxima was stolen, Owens was stopped by the police while driving it.  The ignition was damaged, a side vent window was broken, and it was being operated with an altered BMW key.  He was convicted of RSP after the judge responded to a jury note asking for clarification on the required mens rea – whether the defendant possessed the car “knowing or having reason to believe that the property was stolen.”  Without objection, the judge instructed the jury that the “reason to believe … determination should be based upon what a reasonable person would have believed under the facts and circumstances as you find them.”   

Issue:  Did the judge commit plain error by instructing the jury that “reason to believe the property was stolen,” the mens rea for RSP, was satisfied by an objective standard, i.e., proof that a reasonable person would have known the car was stolen? 

Holding: The instruction was error because the standard is a subjective one, but reversal is not required under plain error review on the facts here.  If the government is relying on a theory broader than actual knowledge, the following instruction is recommended as a correct legal statement:

Element No. 3 requires that the defendant either knew or had reason to believe that the property was stolen.  This state of mind is a subjective one, focusing on the  defendant’s  actual state of mind, and not simply on what a reasonable person might have thought.  In determining whether the government has met its burden of proving the defendant’s subjective state of mind, you may consider what a reasonable person would have believed under the facts and circumstances as you find them.  But guilty knowledge cannot be established by demonstrating mere negligence or even foolishness on the part of the defendant.  It may, nonetheless, be satisfied by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious to him.   

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