Returning stolen property for a reward may not be a crime under certain circumstances. And sometimes, Kool-Aid steals laptops.

Lihlakha v. United States, No. 12-CM-606 (decided April 24, 2014)

The Players: Judges Glickman, Easterly, and Ferren.  Opinion by Judge Ferren.  Concurring opinion by Judge Easterly.  R. Michael Labelle for appellant.  Trial Judge: Truman Morrison III.

The Facts: The complainant's laptop was stolen from outside her Howard University dorm room, prompting her to post signs around campus promising a reward for the return of her laptop.  Shortly thereafter, the defendant, Jessica Lihlakha, called the complainant and represented that she may be able to obtain the laptop and return it for the promised reward.  The laptop had apparently been stolen by "Kool-Aid"--a local drug dealer, not the delicious sugary beverage--and Kool-Aid gave the computer to the defendant to return in exchange for the reward money.  When the defendant attempted to return the laptop to the complainant, she was greeted by an undercover officer, who placed her under arrest.  At trial, the defendant was convicted of receiving stolen property.  On appeal, she challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting that conviction.  The Court of Appeals determined that sufficient evidence supported her conviction but remanded for further proceedings because the trial judge failed to recognize the existence of a return-for-reward defense to the charge of RSP.

Issue: Whether the law recognizes a "return-for-reward" defense to the fourth element of D.C. Code 22-3232(a) (2001), which requires the government to prove that the defendant acted "with the intent to deprive another of the right to the property or a benefit of the property."

Holding: Yes, if certain conditions are met.  A defendant "may establish a return-for-reward defense that negates the requisite intent for receiving stolen property if the evidence shows that: (1) the reward had been announced . . . before the property was possessed or agreed to be possessed; (2) the person claiming the reward had nothing to do with the theft; (3) the possessor returned the property without unreasonable delay to the rightful owner or to a law enforcement officer; and (4) the possessor imposed no condition on the return of the property."  As Judge Easterly's concurrence clarifies (and as the majority opinion establishes less directly), "[s]eeking a previously announced reward in exchange for the return of stolen property is not such an impermissible condition."

Of Note: Lihlakha interprets the old receiving stolen property statute, which was modified in April 20, 2012, to delete the "intent to deprive" element at issue in this case.  Thus, Lihlakha is most directly applicable to cases where the crime was committed prior to April 20, 2012, and any attempt to apply Lihlakha's ruling to subsequent cases would require the litigant to argue that the holding remains applicable to the new statute despite the modification.  CK.

Read the full opinion here.