Gary Frye v. United States, No. 12-CM-1438 (decided March 13, 2014)
The Players: Judges Thompson, Easterly, and Farrell. Opinion by Judge Farrell. Dissent by Judge Easterly.
Andrew Murnane for Appellant. Trial Judge: Judge Nash.
The Facts: Responding
to a 911 call, police arrived at a home on Texas Ave., S.E. to find Jewel
Parker and Gary Frye arguing at the top of a stair case. Officers immediately separated
the two and placed them in different bedrooms. When police asked Parker “what [had] happened,” she stated
that the two were arguing over Frye’s use of PCP, that she locked herself in a
room where she “felt safe,” and that Frye then kicked the door in, grabbed her,
shoved her into the floor, and tried to choke her. According to the police,
Parker was extremely upset during the interview, was “shaking . . . and . . .
crying,” and seemed to need medical attention.
Frye was tried in a bench
trial before the Honorable Stuart Nash. Parker did not testify at trial. Over defense objection, the government introduced
the statement Parker made to the police. At the close of trial, Judge Nash found Frye guilty of simple
assault.
Issue: Did the admission of Parker’s statement violate Frye’s Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation?
Holding: No.
The Court held that Parker’s statements were
nontestimonial because they were made to help the police meet an “on-going
emergency” and not with the primary purpose of producing evidence to be used
against Frye at trial. The Court
noted that when officers arrived on the scene, they did not know what happened,
saw two individuals fighting, and faced a “fluid and somewhat confused”
situation about which they knew almost nothing. When the officers asked Parker “what happened,” they were
concerned with securing the “volatile” situation, not with obtaining evidence. And when Parker answered them, she was
“appeal[ing] for safety,” not trying to “establish facts for an eventual
prosecution.”
The Court acknowledged that police had separated Parker
and Frye when they questioned her, a fact significant to the Supreme Court in Hammon v. Indiana. See
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). But unlike in Hammon,
where the police encountered no apparent emergency when they arrived on the
scene and where the declarant told police that everything was fine, police
discovered Parker and Frye arguing.
Parker remained upset during the interview and was visibly shaking and
crying. This made it highly
unlikely that she was trying to give a statement for use in a criminal
prosecution. Further, the Court
did not believe that the emergency was over. Officers
still needed to discern whether the children in the house were at risk or in
need of social services, and whether Parker needed medical attention.
Ms. Parker’s “excited” demeanor also supported the
Court’s conclusion that the statement was nontestimonial. Parker’s “acute emotional distress,
which made her answers undisputed ‘excited utterances,’ . . . implied that her
attention was focused more on ‘ending a threatening situation’ than on ‘proving
past events.’”
The Dissent: The
dissent criticized the majority’s conclusion that there was an “on-going
emergency.” Parker and Frye were
in separate rooms when police questioned her. The “on-going emergency” exception therefore did not
apply. The dissent also did
not believe that the record supported the majority’s conclusion that Parker was
“plead[ing] for safety for herself and her children” when she spoke to the
police. “[N]othing in the record
indicates that when she spoke to the police she wanted to do anything other
than report criminal activity.” The
dissent accused the majority of engaging in impermissible speculation.
Of Note: Counsel should argue that even after Frye, the “on-going emergency” exception
is a narrow one. Frye involved a unique group of facts:
when police arrived on the scene, they did not know what had happened, and they
immediately observed an ongoing argument.
Even when they separated Frye from Parker, the emergency was not
obviously over. Parker had
injuries that could require medical attention, and Parker’s children were still
running throughout the house. The
situation had not been defused. Counsel
should try to distinguish Frye on
this basis. Further, the police in
Frye asked only one question. Additional police questioning could undermine
the inference that they are merely responding to an ongoing emergency.
Read the full opinion here.
Read the full opinion here.
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