Ruffin v. United States, No. 12-CF-956 (decided Sept. 5, 2013)
Players: Washington, Blackburne-Rigsby, Nebeker. Opinion by Judge Blackburne-Rigsby. PDS for Mr. Ruffin. Trial judge: Michael L. Rankin.
Facts: Officer Amaya was investigating a report of a burglary when he encountered Mr. Ruffin hopping over a retaining wall. Mr. Ruffin looked “surprised” and “startled” when he turned and saw the police officer. Officer Amaya immediately put his hands on Mr. Ruffin. As he did so, his hand hit Mr. Ruffin’s shoulder. Mr. Ruffin brushed the officer’s hand off his shoulder. Officer Amaya further described Mr. Ruffin’s motion as “elbowing to the back with his right arm.” Later, when told he was about to be placed in a police car, Mr. Ruffin warned, “You put me in there, I’m going to kick out the windows.”
Issue 1: Does pulling one’s arm away from a police officer amount to “resistance” of the officer under the assault on a police officer (“APO”) statute?
Issue 2: Can a threat to destroy property owned by the District of Columbia constitute a felony threat?
Held on Issue 1: Mr. Ruffin’s minimal motion did not rise to the level of “active and oppositional conduct” required for a violation of the APO statute.
Held on Issue 2: The District is not a “person” within the meaning of the threats statute. Therefore, a threat to property owned by the District is not encompassed by the statute.
Of Note on APO:
- Mr. Ruffin’s “discrete act of immediately pulling his arm away from Officer Amaya” did not amount to resistance of Officer Amaya. Ruffin, slip op. at 7.
- Mr. Ruffin’s act of pulling away can be distinguished from (1) hiding one’s hands and breaking free from a police officer’s grip by swinging one’s arm’s forward, (2) concealing one’s arms under one’s body and refusing to comply with police orders to show hands, and (3) holding a gate closed to prevent an officer from entering. Id. at 9-10 (distinguishing In re J.S., 19 A.3d 328, 330 (D.C. 2011), Coghill v. United States, 982 A.2d 802, 807 (D.C. 2009), and Dolson v. United States, 948 A.2d 1193, 1202 (D.C. 2008)).
- In contrast, Mr. Ruffin’s “ephemeral elbow jerk in response to a police officer reaching towards his shoulder did not amount to ‘resisting a police officer.” Id. at 11.
- The “APO statute does not criminalize every refusal to submit to a police officer or every prevention or hindrance of an officer in his duties.” Id. at 11 (quoting J.S., 19 A.3d at 331).
Of Note on Felony Threats:
- “[T]he context of the felony threats statute indicates that its use of ‘person’ is limited to natural persons, thereby excluding threats to property owned by artificial entities—particularly the District of Columbia[.]” Id. at 30.
- The Court rejected the government’s secondary argument that Mr. Ruffin violated the felony threat statute by threatening a vehicle in which Officer Pena had a possessory interest: “[O]wnership—not a property interest—is an element of the felony threats statute. The felony threats statute does not protect victims with interests in, but not ownership of, the threatened property.” Id. at 29.
How to Use:
In analyzing the APO statute, the Court emphasized that Mr. Ruffin was “surprised” and “startled” when he turned and saw Officer Amaya. Id. at 3. Under these circumstances, the government failed to show that Mr. Ruffin’s act of pulling away from Officer Amaya was anything other than a “mere reflex.” Id. at 3. The Court’s reasoning can be useful in a situation where a client has been taken by surprise and is reacting reflexively to being handled by police.
