Leaving after colliding requires reason to believe a collision occurred.

Crawford v. United States (decided Sept. 6, 2018)

Players: Chief Judge Blackburne-Rigsby, Associate Judge McLeese, and Senior Judge Nebeker. Opinion by Chief Judge Blackburne-Rigsby. Dissenting Opinion by Senior Judge Nebeker. Rupa Ranga Puttagunta for Appellant. Trial Judge: Yvonne Williams.

Facts: Appellant was convicted for leaving after colliding with property damage. At trial, officers testified that they heard a “loud crash” while appellant was moving his car out of a parallel parking space. One officer testified that appellant’s vehicle was “up against the [one] in front of it,” a Volvo, having apparently collided with it, and that appellant then reversed and drove away at about ten miles per hour. The Volvo’s owner testified that he later observed a white streak along its rear bumper. Appellant denied having collided with the vehicle.

In rendering its findings of fact, the trial court expressed doubt as to whether appellant knew he had been in a collision, noting that he could have grazed the bumper without realizing it. The court nevertheless found appellant guilty based on its determination that lack of knowledge was no defense.

Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred by determining that lack of knowledge was not a defense?

Holding 1: Yes. “[N]ot being aware of the collision constitutes a proper defense if the operator of the vehicle did not know or have reason to believe that he or she had collided with another vehicle.” 

Issue 2: Whether, on remand, the trial court may reweigh the evidence and render a new verdict?

Holding 2: Yes. The trial court made no findings as to whether appellant should have known he had been in an accident.

Dissent: No. The trial court’s findings reflect reasonable doubt as to the mens rea for the offense and should compel a verdict of acquittal. WC.

Read the full opinion here.

DCCA: Neither the Second Amendment nor Wrenn bars CPWL prosecution of those with prior felony convictions.

Hooks v. United States (decided August 30, 2018)

Players: Associate Judges Fisher, Beckwith, and McLeese. Opinion by Judge Fisher. Donald L. Dworsky for Mr. Hooks. Trial Judge: Kimberly S. Knowles.

Issue 1: Whether the evidence suffices to support appellant’s convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm (UPF), carrying a pistol without a license (CPWL), possession of an unregistered firearm (UF), and unlawful possession of ammunition (UA)?

Holding 1: Yes. The evidence showed that as police were approaching appellant, he walked over to a metal dumpster; that the officers heard something metal hit the dumpster; and that appellant took his arm out of the dumpster and walked away. The officers found a loaded pistol in the dumpster and nothing else that would account for the noise they heard. When they pursued appellant, he ran. This evidence suffices to show beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant possessed the loaded pistol. Appellant stipulated to the remaining elements, including his prior felony conviction, at trial.

Issue 2: Whether the appellant’s CPWL conviction violated the Second Amendment?

Holding 2: No. Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017) did not invalidate the CPWL statute; it only invalidated (and enjoined enforcement of) the requirement to demonstrate “good reason to fear injury” or some other “proper” need to carry a pistol before obtaining a license to do so. That requirement is severable from the provision that penalizes carrying a pistol without a license and requires licensees to be otherwise “suitable” to obtain a license. Appellant was not “suitable” and further had no Second Amendment right to carry a pistol outside of his home because he had been convicted of a felony. WC.

Read the full opinion here.

Police have a duty to preserve tangible evidence that comes even temporarily within their possession, custody, or control.

Weems v. United States (decided August 9, 2018)

Players: Associate Judges Glickman and Easterly, Senior Judge Pryor. Opinion for the Court by Judge Glickman. Concurring Opinion by Judge Easterly. D.C. Law Students in Court for Weems. Trial Judge: Ann O’Regan Keary.

Facts: Weems was arrested for shoplifting. Evidence showed that after Weems took four watches from a Wal-Mart jewelry department, a manager followed him to the bedding department, where Weems removed the security tags and packaging. The manager contacted the store security guard, an off-duty MPD officer. The officer and manager then went to confront Weems and found him taking more watches out of their packaging.

After placing Weems under arrest, the officer confiscated the watches but eventually returned them to Wal-Mart. The record does not show what happened to them after. The officer did not collect the security tags from the watches. Surveillance from the incident was lost in a hard drive crash in 2014. At trial, Weems moved for dismissal or appropriate sanction based on the government’s failure to preserve the watches, security tags, and surveillance. The trial court rejected this motion and found Weems guilty at a bench trial.

Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to sanction the government for violating Rule 16(a)(1)(E)?

Holding: No. There can be no violation of Rule 16(a)(1)(E) from failure to preserve tangible evidence that was never within the government’s possession, custody, or control. “Possession” means actual, not constructive, possession. “Custody” refers to property held for third-party benefit. “Control” means a “legal right” to access property “on demand,” for instance, by virtue of a contract or intergovernmental agreement.  On the other hand, neither third-party willingness to produce evidence nor government ability to obtain it by subpoena is sufficient to create “control.”

Under this test, the government only had a duty to preserve the watches seized, albeit briefly, by the police. By contrast, the police never assumed possession, custody, or control of the video or security tags, and there was no duty to preserve them based on the Wal-Mart employees’ role in the investigation. Participating did not make them “agents of law enforcement” or give MPD legal right to obtain the video and security tags. The watches, on the other hand, were confiscated by police and thus were in the government’s actual, physical custody, even if only temporarily. Even so, the trial court appropriately denied sanctions because there was no evidence of bad faith and the watches had little if any evidentiary value.

Of Note: 

• This opinion does not alter the government’s duty to preserve written and recorded defendant statements under former Rule 16(a)(1)(A)/current Rule 16(a)(1)(B), which is governed by the Court’s opinion in Robinson v. United States, 825 A.2d 318 (D.C. 2003). See Slip Op. at 13-14.
• The Court recognizes “that there could be circumstances in which a private party is sufficiently aligned with and subject to the direction of the police or prosecutor as to be deemed a member of the prosecution team for Rule 16 purposes,” but finds no such circumstances on the record presented.
• Judge Easterly’s concurrence emphasizes that this holding does not take into account any official agreement between Wal-Mart and MPD or the fact that the officer retained his police powers and obligation to preserve evidence while off duty. Because possession/custody/control is a fact-bound inquiry, these factors may or may not lead to a different outcome in a different case. WC

Read the full opinion here.