Alexander Hughes v. United States
(decided December 15, 2016).
Players: Associate Judges Glickman and
McLeese, Senior Judge Reid. Opinion by Senior Judge Reid. Jason Kalafat for Mr. Hughes. Trial judge: John
Ramsey Johnson.
Facts:
Mr. Hughes was indicted on twenty-six charges arising out of alleged long-term
sexual abuse of three supervisees. Six
counts involved complainants Ms. Sanchez and Ms. Mohamud. These were all misdemeanor charges arising
out of incidents in which Mr. Hughes allegedly hit both women on the buttocks
with wet towels, attempted to touch Ms. Sanchez’s breast, and threw bleach on Ms.
Mohamud’s clothed buttocks. The
remaining twenty counts involved complainant Ms. Lopez. These included misdemeanors similar to the
others, but also first and second degree sexual assault and kidnapping charges
arising out of repeated instances of forced anal and oral penetration, some
accomplished via physical force and others via threats of firing. All of the charged incidents occurred at the
workplace where the appellant and three complainants worked together in food
service.
The trial
court denied a pretrial motion to sever the charges relating to Ms. Lopez from
those relating to the other two complainants, ruling that all of the offenses
were mutually admissible under Toliver and
Johnson, as context to help explain
why the women did not report the alleged abuse sooner. All three women thereafter testified at
trial, describing a work environment in which Mr. Hughes routinely harassed and
assaulted his female supervisees. The prosecution
also presented DNA evidence corroborating the more serious sexual assault charges
relating to Ms. Lopez. The defense
theory was that the buttocks hitting and other minor incidents were consensual
“horseplay” and that Ms. Lopez had fabricated the serious assaults. Mr. Hughes was convicted of fourteen counts,
including many of the serious and misdemeanor counts relating to Ms. Lopez, one
count relating to Ms. Sanchez, and all three counts relating to Ms. Mohamud.
Issue: Did the trial court err in denying the
motion for severance?
Holding: Yes.
The Court held that Mr. Hughes’s harassing and assaultive acts against
each of the complainants were “inextricably linked,” as required for admission
under Toliver. The evidence of serious sexual assaults
against Ms. Lopez, however, would have been so unduly prejudicial at a separate
trial on the Ms. Sanchez and Ms. Mohamud misdemeanors that it could not be
deemed mutually admissible. The Court
explained: “In a case where a defendant
is being tried for far less serious conduct, such as the misdemeanor offenses
at issue in this case . . . the prejudicial effect of introducing evidence of
graphic and far more serious other crimes can dwarf any legitimate value the
evidence might have.” Op. at 28 (citation
and alteration omitted). Here, this risk
that the jury’s guilty verdicts for the charges relating to Ms. Sanchez and Ms.
Mohamud were based on an impermissible propensity inference from the serious evidence
relating to Ms. Lopez was serious enough to meet the requirement for reversal
based on the erroneous denial of severance:
“the most compelling prejudice from which the trial court would be
unable to afford protection” (Op. at 26-27).
Accordingly, the Court reversed the convictions related to Ms. Sanchez
and Ms. Mohamud. Finding no
corresponding risk that evidence of the relatively minor Ms. Sanchez and Ms. Mohamud
incidents would have been unduly prejudicial in a separate trial on the assaults
against Ms. Lopez, the Court affirmed the convictions relating to conduct
against Ms. Lopez.
Of Note:
- The Court rejected appellant’s argument that Toliver only provides for the admission of uncharged other crimes evidence. Whether charged or uncharged, the pertinent admissibility question under Toliver is whether the evidence is so “inextricably linked” to the charged offense that the latter “is not clearly explainable to the jury without the evidence” of the other crime. Op. at 25.
- The trial court held, and the government argued on appeal, that the various offenses were also mutually admissible under Drew. The Court of Appeals deemed it unnecessary to address this issue.
- The Court rejected appellant’s sufficiency challenges. In particular, it found sufficient evidence that Ms. Lopez was reasonable in fearing she would be fired if she refused to perform the sexual acts at issue in the second degree sexual abuse charges, and held that the fact she sometimes laughed when Mr. Hughes hit her on the buttocks did not negate other evidence indicating such contacts were unwanted. FT.
