The DCCA did not issue any criminal opinions this week.

The DCCA clarifies the mens rea for receiving stolen property and writes a model instruction.

Alphonso Owens v. United States, 13-CF-1332 (decided May 15, 2014)

The Players: Judges Fisher, Easterly and Ferren.  Opinion by Judge Fisher.  William T. Morrison  for appellant.  Trial Judge:  Heidi Pasichow.

The Facts: Two days after a Maxima was stolen, Owens was stopped by the police while driving it.  The ignition was damaged, a side vent window was broken, and it was being operated with an altered BMW key.  He was convicted of RSP after the judge responded to a jury note asking for clarification on the required mens rea – whether the defendant possessed the car “knowing or having reason to believe that the property was stolen.”  Without objection, the judge instructed the jury that the “reason to believe … determination should be based upon what a reasonable person would have believed under the facts and circumstances as you find them.”   

Issue:  Did the judge commit plain error by instructing the jury that “reason to believe the property was stolen,” the mens rea for RSP, was satisfied by an objective standard, i.e., proof that a reasonable person would have known the car was stolen? 

Holding: The instruction was error because the standard is a subjective one, but reversal is not required under plain error review on the facts here.  If the government is relying on a theory broader than actual knowledge, the following instruction is recommended as a correct legal statement:

Element No. 3 requires that the defendant either knew or had reason to believe that the property was stolen.  This state of mind is a subjective one, focusing on the  defendant’s  actual state of mind, and not simply on what a reasonable person might have thought.  In determining whether the government has met its burden of proving the defendant’s subjective state of mind, you may consider what a reasonable person would have believed under the facts and circumstances as you find them.  But guilty knowledge cannot be established by demonstrating mere negligence or even foolishness on the part of the defendant.  It may, nonetheless, be satisfied by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious to him.   

Read full opinion here.  

Picking up a knife to defend yourself from a person hurling household objects at you is not “excessive force.”

Shirley Williams v. United States, No. 12-CM-474 (decided May 15, 2014)

The Players: Judges Beckwith, Easterly, and Belson.  Opinion by Judge Belson.  Raymond J. Rigat for appellant.  Trial Judge: Brian Holeman.

The Facts: When Ms. Williams came to pick up her children from their paternal grandparents, a fight broke out between her and the children’s grandmother, Jennifer Bragg, in an upstairs bedroom.  Ms. Williams testified that she retreated downstairs, where the front door was locked and she could not get out.  The government did not call the alleged victim, but her husband and Ms. Williams both testified that once the women were downstairs, objects were flying around and breaking.  Ms. Williams testified that the complainant was hurling the objects at her, while the husband testified that he did not know who threw them.  Ms. Williams testified that she ran to the kitchen and picked up a knife to defend herself.  The Braggs’ son testified that at this point he came up from the basement and took the knife from Ms. Williams without a struggle. 

The trial judge acquitted Ms. Williams of assault because the government failed to establish that Bragg was not the first aggressor in the bedroom.  As for the events downstairs, the trial judge did not resolve the question of who was hurling the objects but nonetheless convicted Ms. Williams of attempted possession of a prohibited weapon (knife), D.C. Code § 22-4514(b) (“PPW(b)”), on the ground that even if Ms. Williams was the victim downstairs – with the complaining witness throwing objects at her – it was excessive under the circumstances to pick up and brandish a knife rather than try to find a way to escape.   

Issue:  Did the government adduce evidence sufficient to establish that the defendant’s brandishing of a knife under the circumstances was not in self-defense? 

Holding:  No.  If indeed Ms. Williams was the one under attack (objects thrown at her downstairs), then the brandishing of a knife was not excessive force as a matter of law.  Ms. Williams was acting in “the heat of conflict” and her reactions must be accorded leeway and not be judged by the standards of “a calm mind”; and merely brandishing a knife should not be confused with the actual use of deadly force.  While the Court would normally remand on the question the judge did not address – who was the aggressor with respect to hurling objects – it was unnecessary to do so here because the government failed to adduce sufficient evidence that Ms. Williams was the one hurling the objects where her testimony on the point was uncontroverted.  SF.

Read the full opinion here.

No new criminal opinions this week either. In lieu of content, we leave you with adorable puppies.

The DCCA did not issue any new criminal opinions this week.